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BEST MODE TRADE SECRETS
†
  
BRIAN J. LOVE

 
CHRISTOPHER B. SEAMAN

 
 
 
Trade secrecy and patent rights traditionally have been considered 
mutually exclusive.
1
  Trade secret rights are premised on secrecy.  Without 
it, they evaporate.
2
  Patent rights, on the other hand, require public 
disclosure.
3
  Absent a sufficiently detailed description of the invention, 
patents are invalid.
4
 
However, with the passage of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act 
(“AIA”)5 last fall, this once black-and-white distinction may melt into 
something a little more gray.  Buried amidst myriad tweaks to the Patent 
Act is one that has the potential to substantially change the boundary 
between patent and trade secret protection.  For the first time since at least 
1952 (and as a practical matter since 1870), an inventor’s failure to 
disclose in her patent the preferred method for carrying out the 
invention—the so-called “best mode”—will no longer invalidate her 
patent rights or otherwise render them unenforceable.
6
  This reform lowers 
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1 See, e.g., Michael Risch, Trade Secret Law and Information Development Incentives, in THE LAW 
AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRETS:  A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 152, __ (Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2009) (“Patent law and trade secret law cannot be 
coextensive because trade secrets must be secret and patents must be publicly disclosed.”). 
2 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (defining a trade secret as “any 
information that can be used in the operation of a business or other enterprise and that is sufficiently 
valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic advantage over others.”). 
3 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1998) (“[T]he patent system represents a carefully 
crafted bargain that encourages . . .  the public disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in 
return for an exclusive monopoly for a limited period of time.”). 
4 See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to 
which it pertains . . . to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention.”); In re Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (“[T]o be 
enabling, the specification of a patent must teach those skilled in the art how to make and use the full 
scope of the claimed invention without ‘undue experimentation.’”). 
5 Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011) (codified in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.). 
6 AIA § 15(a) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(a)(3)(A)) (effective Sept. 16, 2011).  The Patent Act of 
1952 was the first to require disclosure of the best mode for all classes of inventions.  U.S. Patent Act 
of 1952, ch. 950, § 40, 66 Stat. 792.  The Patent Act of 1870 demanded disclosure of the best mode for 
practicing the patented invention, but this early requirement applied only to machine patents.  See U.S. 
Patent Act of 1870, ch. 230, § 26, 16 Stat. 198.  However, the lion’s share of patents issued in the 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2056115
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patent applicants’ disclosure incentives and may usher in a new era of 
patent practice in which inventors attempt to secure both twenty-year 
patent terms and possibly indefinite trade secret protection for their 
inventions—an outcome that Congress may not have considered before 
passing the law.
7
  Patent owners, applicants, attorneys, and courts will 
soon have to navigate the implications of this important change.
8
 
In this brief Essay, we explain why it may become routine post-patent 
reform for patentees to attempt to assert both patent rights and trade secret 
rights for preferred embodiments of their invention in certain types of 
cases.  We also consider potentially undesirable ramifications of this 
change and suggest one approach courts may use to limit claims of 
concurrent trade secret and patent protection when equity demands. 
I. THE TRADE SECRET-PATENT DICHOTOMY AND  
BEST MODE BEFORE AIA 
Patentees have long been obligated to disclose in their patents enough 
information to teach others skilled in the relevant technological field how 
to use the invention once their patent rights expire.  This requirement, 
called enablement, “is part of the quid pro quo of the patent bargain”—
disclosure in exchange for a limited monopoly.
9
  Enablement, however, 
 
 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries covered mechanical inventions.  See, e.g., Robert P. Merges, 
As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and 
Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 585 (1999) (“Everyone knew that manufactures 
and machines were at the core of the patent system. Agricultural and industrial machinery was almost 
synonymous with ‘patents.’”); B. ZORINA KHAN, THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF INNOVATION: PATENTS 
AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920, at 71 tbl.3.1 (2005) 
(breaking-down patents issued during the 1840s by technology). 
7 Compare Tun-Jen Chiang, Guest Post on Best Mode by Tun-Jen Chiang:  Was Congress Dumb, or 
Was It Lying?–A Reply to Professor Sheppard, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 29, 2011, 4:12 pm), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/guest-post-was-congress-dumb-or-was-it-lying-a-reply-to-
professor-sheppard.html, with A. Christal Sheppard , Guest Post:  Because Inquiring Minds Want to 
Know – Best Mode – Why Is It One-Sided?, PATENTLY-O (Sept. 28, 2011, 12:42 pm), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/guest-post-because-inquiring-minds-want-to-know-best-
mode-why-is-it-one-sided-.html. 
8 See infra note 53 and accompanying text (explaining that AIA's changes to best mode became 
effective upon its enactment on September 16, 2011).  Most patent cases filed after the AIA’s 
enactment are still at the discovery stage at the time of this Essay’s publication.  See CATHERINE 
RAJWANI, CONTROLLING COSTS IN PATENT LITIGATION, at 2 (2008), 
http://www.harborlaw.com/newsletters/november.pdf (estimating that in a patent case fact discovery 
will last approximately 9 months from the answer deadline).  Few of these cases will reach the 
summary judgment stage or trial—where there may be a substantive decision on best mode—until 
2013.  Id.; Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J. 1, 17-19 tbl.6 (2010) 
(finding the average time to trial in a patent case is longer than two years in most districts). 
9 AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also Dmitry Karshtedt, Did 
Learned Hand Get It Wrong?  The Questionable Patent Forfeiture Rule of Metallizing Engineering, 57 
VILL. L. REV. 101, 137 (forthcoming 2012) (“[T]he disclosure rationale for the patent system can be 
framed as part of the quid pro quo of the patent system: the patentee receives a monopoly right to 
exclude others from practicing his or her invention in exchange for revealing technical information to 
the public.”). 
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only serves as a floor for disclosure
10—it requires a patentee to provide 
enough information “for a person skilled in the art to make and use the 
invention without undue experimentation” and nothing more.11   
Best mode,
12
 which is “‘separate and distinct from enablement,’”13 
helps fill the gap between enablement’s minimum disclosure and the 
inventor’s own knowledge about her preferred implementation of the 
invention.  Its purpose “is to restrain inventors from applying for patents 
while at the same time concealing from the public preferred embodiments 
of the inventions they have in fact conceived.”14  Best mode requires a 
patent applicant “‘to disclose the best mode contemplated by him, as of the 
time he executes the application, of carrying out the invention.’”15  Unlike 
enablement, then, best mode has both subjective and objective 
components.  The first part, which is subjective, inquires “whether the 
inventor considered a particular mode of practicing the invention to be 
superior to all other modes at the time of filing” the application.16  If so, 
the inventor must satisfy the objective prong, which requires that she 
“adequately disclose[] the mode . . . considered to be superior.”17 
In addition to teaching future generations how to make and use the 
patented invention (in theory, anyway
18), patent law’s disclosure 
requirements also ensure that the invention eventually enters the public 
domain where it can be used by all for free.  Like any other public 
disclosure, a patentee’s disclosure of the best mode excludes trade secret 
protection for the invention’s preferred embodiment.19  The Uniform 
Trade Secrets Act (“UTSA”), which has been adopted by 46 states,20 
defines a trade secret as “information . . . that . . . derives independent 
economic value . . . from not being generally known to, and not being 
 
 
10 See Alan J. Devlin, The Misunderstood Function of Disclosure in Patent Law, 23 HARV. J. L. & 
TECH. 401, 445 (2010) (explaining that “§ 112 reflects the minimum disclosure required by 
Congress”). 
11 In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 735 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
12 See 35 U.S.C. 112, ¶ 1 (“The specification . . . shall set forth the best mode contemplated by the 
inventor of carrying out his invention.”). 
13 Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc. 301 F.3d 1306, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting In re Gay, 309 
F.2d 769, 772 (C.C.P.A. 1962). 
14 Teleflex, Inc. v. Ficosia N. Am. Corp., 299 F.3d 1313, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
15 Id.  
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 See Mark A. Lemley, Ignoring Patents, 2008 MICH. ST. L. REV. 19, 21-22 (noting that companies 
generally ignore patents in all stages of product development: when conducting research and design, 
when filing their own patents, when launching new products, and even after receiving initial cease-
and-desist letters from patent owners); Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Do Patents Disclose Useful 
Information?, 25 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 531, 534 (2012) (finding in a survey of nanotechnology 
researchers that 55% reported never reading a single patent to obtain technical information). 
19 See, e.g., R. CARL MOY, 2 MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 7:52 (4th ed. 2011) (explaining that the 
disclosure required under best mode and trade secret law are “in inherent conflict”). 
20 See Trade Secrets Act, THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE 
LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Trade Secrets Act (last visited Apr. 21, 2012). 
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readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use.”21  The dissemination of an 
alleged trade secret in a patent—or, since 1999, in a published patent 
application
22—is antithetical to this secrecy requirement.  “Publication in a 
patent destroys the trade secret because patents are intended to be widely 
disclosed.”23  As a result, “the information contained within [a patent],” 
including best mode, “is ordinarily regarded as public and not subject to 
protection as a trade secret.”24 
 For example, in Chemcast Corp. v. Arco Industries Corp.,
25
 the 
Federal Circuit made clear that the existence of an alleged trade secret did 
not excuse a patentee’s failure to comply with the best mode requirement.  
In that case, the plaintiff, Chemcast, held a patent claiming a sealing 
member in the form of a grommet or plug button designed to seal an 
opening in a panel.  The claim at issue contained an open-ended limitation 
that the locking portion of the sealing member must consist of a material 
exceeding a certain hardness level.
26
  The inventor’s preferred material for 
the locking portion, a particular type of plastic specially developed for 
Chemcast and considered a trade secret, was not disclosed in the 
specification.
27
  The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
conclusion that the inventor improperly concealed the best mode because 
“skilled practitioners could neither have known what [his] contemplated 
best mode was nor have carried it out” based on the patent’s disclosure.28  
It further explained that the material’s alleged trade secret status was not a 
defense to disclosure, holding that “[w]hatever the scope of [the] asserted 
trade secret, to the extent it includes information known by [the inventor] 
that he considered part of his preferred mode, section 112 requires that he 
divulge it.”29 
 
 
21 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (1985).  Similarly, the Restatement (Third) of Unfair 
Competition defines a trade secret as “any information that can be used in the operation of a business 
or other enterprise and that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic 
advantage over others.”  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1995) (emphasis 
added). 
22 Before 1999, patent applications were not publicly disclosed by the PTO until and unless the 
application issued as a patent.  The American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 
113 Stat. 1501, provided that all patent applications would be published eighteen months after filing, 
unless the applicant requests otherwise and certifies that the invention has not and will not be the 
subject of an application filed in a foreign country.  Id. § 4502 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)); see 
Tewari De-Ox Sys., Inc. v. Mt. States/Rosen, L.L.C., 637 F.3d 604, 612 (5th Cir. 2011) (holding that 
information in a published patent application cannot be a trade secret).   
23 BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation, Inc., 463 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2006) (internal 
citation omitted).  
24 On-Line Tech. v. Bodenseewerk Perkin-Elmer, 386 F.3d 1133, 1141 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
25 913 F.2d 923 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
26 Id. at 925. 
27 Id. at 929. 
28 Id. at 930. 
29 Id. 
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 Under the 1952 Patent Act, an inventor’s failure to disclose best 
mode during prosecution would result in a rejection by the patent 
examiner.
30
  In practice, however, this was extremely uncommon because 
it required “the examiner to conclude that the inventor, at the time of filing 
the application, actually knew of a better mode of practicing the claimed 
invention.”31  Rather, the primary means of enforcing best mode was in 
litigation.  Failure to disclose best mode in an issued patent was a defense 
to infringement and would render the patent invalid.
32
  In addition, the 
intentional concealment of best mode also could result in a finding of 
inequitable conduct, which would render the patent unenforceable.
33
   
II.  BEST MODE IN THE AIA 
After years of unsuccessful attempts to reform patent law,
34
 the AIA 
was signed into law on September 16, 2011.  The AIA formally retained 
the best mode requirement in § 112 of the Patent Act, while at the same 
time eliminating the most important mechanism by far for enforcing that 
requirement.  Specifically, section 15 of the AIA provides that “failure to 
disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any claim of a patent 
may be cancelled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable.”35  Thus, 
post patent reform, “patents applicants must disclose the best mode to 
receive a patent, but in the event a patent is obtained despite a failure to 
comply with section 112’s best mode requirement no challenge to the 
patent rights can be made on this failure.”36 
This unusual result appears to be a compromise between those who 
wanted to preserve best mode in some fashion and those who wanted to 
eliminate it entirely.  Influenced by the National Academies’ 2004 report A 
Patent System for the 21st Century,
37
 opponents cited several reasons for 
abolishing best mode.  First, they argued that best mode “significantly 
increase[d] the expense and complexity of litigation” because it required 
extensive discovery into the inventor's subjective belief regarding whether 
 
 
30 Ryan G. Vacca, Patent Reform and Best Mode: A Signal to the Patent Office or a Step Toward 
Elimination?, 75 ALBANY L. REV. 279, 293 (2012). 
31 Id. at 294.   
32 See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
33 See, e.g., Consol. Aluminum Corp. v. Foseco Int’l, Ltd., 910 F.2d 804 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
34 For additional  discussion of the legislative history of patent reform and best mode, see Joe Matal, A 
Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act:  Part II of II, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 539, 581-
84 (2012); Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst? Dueling Arguments, Empirical Analysis, 
and Recommendations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129, 157-161 (2011); Vacca, supra note 30, at 290-293. 
35 AIA § 15(a) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(a)(3)(A) (2012)).  The AIA also eliminates compliance 
with best mode as a requirement for benefiting from an earlier filing date for previously-filed foreign 
and U.S. patent applications.  AIA § 15(b).  
36 Vacca, supra note 30, at 292. 
37 NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACADEMIES, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 
(Stephen A. Merrill et al. eds., 2004). 
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she had a preferred implementation of the invention at the time of the 
patent application’s filing.38  As a result, they claimed, best mode imposed 
an unnecessary cost on inventors.
39
  Second, opponents contended that 
best mode violations were difficult to prove because the doctrine is 
“inherently subjective” and “the best mode contemplated at the time of the 
invention may not be the best mode for practicing or using the invention 
years later” when the patent might wind up challenged in court.40  Third, 
best mode was criticized as inconsistent with international norms, as the 
requirement was unique to American law.
41
  This imposed a burden on 
foreign applicants seeking patent protection in the U.S., as well as 
requiring domestic inventors to make a more detailed disclosure compared 
to foreign inventors who did not desire U.S. patent protection.
42
 
In contrast, proponents of maintaining the best mode requirement 
contended it was valuable because it required an inventor seeking patent 
protection to make a “high quality” disclosure.43  As a 2007 House 
Judiciary Committee report explained: 
 
The public policy behind [best mode] goes to the heart of the 
reason that patents existed in the United States[:] to advance 
technology (the useful arts) by rewarding inventors for teaching 
the public how to make and use their inventions in the best, most 
effective way of which they aware.  Its inclusion . . . is intended 
to preclude a patentee from maintaining a competitive advantage 
after patent expiration.
44
 
 
 In light of these competing positions, members of the House and 
Senate initially split regarding best mode in patent reform legislation.  In 
2005, a bill co-sponsored by Rep. Lamar Smith (R-TX) and Rep. Howard 
Berman (D-CA) would have entirely eliminated the best mode 
 
 
38 H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 44 (2007); see also NAT'L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 37, at 121 
(“Because the [best mode] defense depends on historical facts and because the inventor's state of mind 
usually can be established only by circumstantial evidence, litigation of this issue—especially pretrial 
discovery—can be extensive and time consuming.”). 
39 See, e.g., 157 CONG. REC. E1175 (June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. Mike Pence) (“In my view, the 
best mode requirement of American law imposes extraordinary and unnecessary costs on inventors.”). 
40 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 54 (2011); see also S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 24-25 (2009) (same); 157 
CONG. REC. S1336 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Jon Kyl) (asserting that “many consider” best 
mode “subjective and possibly irrelevant, as the best mode may change over time”). 
41 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, at 54; S. REP. NO. 111-18, at 24; see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, 
supra note 37, at 121 (“Only the United States imposes a best mode requirement.”). 
42 See H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 44 (2009) (“The third objection to best mode is the expense it adds to 
international filings.  Foreign patent applicants wishing to protect their invention in the United States 
must amend or prepare their applications to meet a requirement that is unnecessary anywhere else.”). 
43 ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT LAW REFORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE 101 
(1992).  Despite this, the Advisory Committee on Patent Law Reform advocated abolishing best mode.  
Id. at 100-103. 
44 H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 43. 
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requirement from § 112.
45
  In contrast, a 2006 bill co-sponsored by Sen. 
Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) would have retained 
best mode unchanged.
46
  Both bills died in committee.  
 In 2007, the House passed a bill that would have eliminated best 
mode as a ground for challenging the patent’s validity in litigation, but 
retained it in § 112 as a requirement for patentability.
47
  In contrast, the 
Senate’s version of patent reform kept best mode unchanged after the 
Senate Judiciary Committee defeated an amendment by Sen. Arlen Specter 
(R-PA) that would have eliminated it as a litigation defense.
48
  This bill 
was favorably reported out of committee but did not receive a floor vote in 
the Senate.
49
 
 However, in 2009, the Senate Judiciary Committee switched 
positions and adopted the House’s position on best mode.  Specifically, it 
favorably reported a version of patent reform legislation which provided 
that “failure to disclose the best mode shall not be a basis on which any 
claim of a patent may be cancelled or held invalid or otherwise 
unenforceable.”50  While neither the House nor the Senate was able to pass 
their respective versions of patent reform in the 111th Congress,
51
 the 
Senate’s action set the stage to finally resolve the issue.  In 2011, both 
chambers passed bills that were substantively identical to the 2009 Senate 
bill regarding best mode.
52
  The AIA’s prohibition on best mode as a 
litigation defense was effective for all cases filed on or after the date of its 
enactment.
53
 
Notably, the legislative history of patent reform is largely silent 
regarding the possibility that removing the most common enforcement 
mechanisms for best mode—invalidity and unenforceability—might result 
in inventors withholding best mode from patent applications and 
subsequently claiming trade secret protection for it.  In the rare occasion 
 
 
45 H.R. 2795 § 4(d), 109th Cong. (2005). 
46 S. 3181, 109th Cong. (2006).  The co-sponsors recognized legislators’ disagreement regarding best 
mode but were hopeful that a mutually-acceptable compromise could be reached on the issue.  152 
CONG. REC. S8830 (Aug. 3, 2006) (statement of Sen. Orrin Hatch). 
47 H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007). 
48 S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 40 (2008). 
49 Sen. Jon Kyl (R-AZ) introduced another, competing bill that would have eliminated best mode 
entirely.  S. 3800 §§ 3(c), 15, 110th Cong. (2008).  No action was taken on this bill. 
50 S. 515 § 14, 111th Cong. (2009). 
51 Somewhat surprisingly, the bill introduced by Rep. John Conyers (D-MI), Chairman of the House 
Judiciary Committee, during the 111th Congress was silent on best mode.  H.R. 1260, 111th Cong. 
(2009).  This bill died in committee. 
52 H.R. 1249 § 15 (2011) (approved 6/23/11, 304-117); S. 23 § 15 (2011) (approved 3/8/11, 95-5).  The 
Senate ultimately approved the House’s version of patent reform without amendment on Sept. 8, 2011 
(89-9). 
53 See AIA § 15(c) (providing that best mode changes “shall take effect upon the date of the enactment 
of this Act and shall apply to proceedings commenced on or after that date”); U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, AMERICA INVENTS ACT:  EFFECTIVE DATES (Oct. 5, 2011), 
http://www.uspto.gov/aia_implementation/aia-effective-dates.pdf. 
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when trade secrecy was mentioned, however, Congress recognized its 
incompatibility with patent law.  For instance, in its 2007 report 
supporting best mode’s retention as a patentability requirement in § 112 
but its removal as an invalidity defense, the House Judiciary Committee 
stated that “effectively retain[ing] a trade secret at the same time as 
receiving patent protection” would “break[] faith with the fundamental 
bargain of patent law.”54  But by removing the most credible enforcement 
mechanisms,
55
 the AIA has apparently opened the door to this type of dual 
protection. 
III. CONCURRENT PATENT AND TRADE SECRET RIGHTS AFTER THE AIA 
In the remainder of this Essay, we discuss the likelihood that with this 
door now open, some patentees will attempt to claim both patent and trade 
secret protection by failing to disclose best mode.  We then explain why 
this development appears problematic from a policy perspective.  Finally, 
we offer one potential equitable response that can help prevent 
unscrupulous patentees from unfairly benefitting from their failure to 
disclose best mode. 
A. Could Concurrent Protection Become Common? 
Though some anticipate that very little will change as a result of the 
AIA’s best mode reforms,56 we predict that a significant number of patent 
owners will attempt to obtain belt-and-suspenders protection for their 
inventions by relying on patents and trade secrecy.  Indeed, look no 
further than the fact that several top law firms have publicly alerted clients 
to the possibility.
57
   
 
 
54 H.R. REP. NO. 110-314, at 43. 
55 See Lee Petherbridge & Jason Rantanen, In Memoriam Best Mode, 64 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 125, 
126-27 (2012) (“[W]hile it is technically true that amended 35 U.S.C. § 112 still ‘requires’ patent 
applicants to disclose a best mode if they know of one, . . . . [t]here is little dispute that this 
development has, as a practical matter, effectively eliminated the best mode requirement from patent 
law.”).  There may, however, be a few limited avenues for the PTO to attempt to enforce the best mode 
requirement during prosecution, such as through attorney disciplinary procedures at the PTO and the 
federal False Statements Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a).  See Vacca, supra note 30, at 296-301.  
56 See Charles Everingham, David Healey & Stephen Susman, 2011 Patent Reform’s Impact on Patent 
Litigation, IPO’S CHAT CHANNEL, at slides 23-24 (Nov. 8, 2011), available at 
http://patentmath.com/multi-party-patent-litigation-after-the-america-invents-act/multi-
party_litigation-slides_revised_post-presentation_dhealey/ (asserting that “[e]limination of Best Mode 
is not a ‘big deal’ to Patent Litigation” and that even after reform the “[p]referred embodiment will 
always be in [the] patent”). 
57 See, e.g., Robert L. Maier, The Big Secret of the America Invents Act, INTELLECTUAL PROP. TODAY, 
Dec. 2011, available at http://www.bakerbotts.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Maier_DEC11.pdf 
(stating that elimination of the best mode defense “theoretically provides the option for dual rights: the 
inventor may still pursue patent protection for his or her invention, and seek broadly-worded patent 
claims covering numerous different implementations, while at the same time maintaining in secret . . . 
his or her best mode for practicing the invention.”); Obtaining Patents Under the America Invents Act 
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And, unfortunately, withholding invention specifics for trade secret 
protection is a strategic move that even a risk-averse inventor might 
consider.
58
  For one, the PTO’s ability to enforce the best mode 
requirement during prosecution is limited given that patent examiners 
generally lack the resources and tools necessary to investigate inventors’ 
subjective knowledge of preferred embodiments.
59
  Also, by the time a 
patent is litigated in court, there is little hope that an accused infringer can 
determine from the face of a complaint whether the patentee’s parallel 
trade secret claim is based on information held back from the PTO years 
earlier.
60
  The “best mode” the inventor must disclose is the one she 
subjectively believed to be best at the time the patent application was filed, 
which of course is not necessarily the embodiment that is objectively 
superior to all others at the time of litigation.
61
  Thus, short of uncovering 
a smoking gun in discovery, an accused infringer often cannot tell ex post 
that a trade secret asserted today was the patentee’s best mode years prior. 
Moreover, the AIA’s expansion of prior user rights considerably 
reduces the risks associated with protecting preferred embodiments as 
trade secrets.  Before patent reform, a trade secret holder ran the risk that 
 
 
(Patent Reform), VENABLE LLP (Oct. 17, 2011), at http://www.venable.com/obtaining-patents-under-
the-america-invents-act-patent-reform-10-17-2011 (“[I]t may be advantageous to seek patent 
protection on general aspects of an invention, while maintaining the best mode as a trade secret.”); 
Clifton E. McCann & Lars H. Genieser, Why Do I Need to Know About The New Patent Law 
(American [sic] Invents Act of 2011), VENABLE LLP (2011), available at 
http://www.venable.com/files/Event/b109636b-04ee-4ea8-82f9-0fe256895686/Presentation/ 
EventAttachment/b6fe68b7-41c6-4a0e-987c-7adc9ca5e111/AIA_Webinar_2011_12_06.pdf 
(“Strategic opportunity: . . . Disclose and claim general aspects of an invention in an application. But 
maintain a specific ‘best mode’ aspect of an invention as a trade secret.”).  
58 As recent history shows, some patentees have been reluctant to make full disclosures in the face of 
uncertainty about the limits of the best mode requirement.  For example, many inventors seeking early 
software patents chose not to disclose their source code to the PTO, even though that code arguably 
represented their preferred embodiment.  See Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1549 
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W]here software constitutes part of a best mode . . . , description of such a best 
mode is satisfied by a disclosure of the functions of the software.”).  Similarly, many early biotech 
inventors chose not to disclosure the specific cell lines used to produce their products.  See Amgen, 
Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (holding that Amgen did not violate 
the best mode requirement by failing to deposit with the PTO the cell line it used to create EPO). 
59 Vacca, supra note 30, at 294.  A patent examiner will spend just 18 hours total on the average 
application he reviews.  See Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1495, 1500 (2001).  As of January 2010, the PTO employed just over 6,000 examiners and faced 
a backlog of more than 700,000 applications awaiting their first office action.  Patent Inventory 
Statistics--FY09, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (2009), at 
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/appbacklog.jsp.   
60 The average litigated patent owned by a product-producing company is asserted 8.6 years after its 
earliest filing date; the average patent owned by a nonpracticing entity (NPE) is asserted about 12 
years post-filing.  Brian J. Love, An Empirical Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could a Patent Term 
Reduction Decimate Trolls without Harming Innovators?, at *24, tbl.5 (working paper 2011), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1917709. 
61 See Donald S. Chisum, Best Mode Concealment and Inequitable Conduct in Patent Procurement: A 
Nutshell, A Review of Recent Federal Circuit Cases and a Plea for Modest Reform, 13 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 277, 280 (1997) (“The ‘mode’ that must be disclosed is not the best in 
fact but rather the one believed to be best by the inventor.”). 
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another inventor might independently discover the same technology and 
obtain a patent.
62
  If that happened (and the invention was not a business 
method
63
), the trade secret holder would be liable for infringement of the 
independent inventor’s patent unless she ceased using the heretofore-secret 
technology after the patent issued.  Post-patent reform, however, many 
incumbent trade secret holders need no longer fear patent infringement 
claims, as the expanded prior user rights in the AIA provide a defense to 
infringement for any person who “commercially used” an invention at 
least one year before the earlier of the asserted patent’s filing date and the 
first public disclosure of the patented invention.
64
 
B.  The Costs and Benefits of Concurrent Protection 
If patentees in fact change strategy and attempt to withhold preferred 
embodiments for trade secret protection, the result will be suboptimal for 
the patent system and the public more generally.
65
  For one, the change 
means that inventors can retain potentially perpetual rights (though 
admittedly narrow ones) in their inventions despite receiving a patent.  
This undermines the fundamental disclosure-for-limited-monopoly 
exchange at the heart of the patent system.  Encouraging inventors to 
disclose their secret inventions, and thereby ensure they eventually enter 
the public domain, has long been viewed as one of the primary 
 
 
62 This is because trade secrecy does not protect against independent invention, and under the previous 
version of 35 U.S.C. § 102(g), a prior inventor who suppressed or concealed her invention was not 
entitled to a patent, thus opening the door for a subsequent inventor to obtain patent protection.  See 
Andrew Beckerman-Rodeau, The Choice Between Patent Protection and Trade Secret Protection: A 
Legal and Business Decision, 84 J. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 371, 387 (2002) (“[I]f the first 
inventor maintains her invention as a trade secret a subsequent second inventor may be entitled to a 
patent on the invention rather than the first inventor.”). 
63 See 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (2006), amended by AIA § 5 (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(a) (2012)). 
64 AIA § 5 (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 273(a) (2012)) (explaining that this prior user defense applies to 
inventions that are “a process . . . , a machine, manufacture or composition of matter used in a 
manufacturing or commercial process”); see also Karshtedt, supra note 9, at 167 (contending that prior 
user rights in the AIA “appear to encourage trade secrecy” in lieu of patent protection because “while 
the owner of a trade secret may still end up facing the patenting of the same invention by a subsequent 
inventor, he or she now has a defense against infringement of the patent”).  However, this prior 
commercial user defense is limited by several constraints, including that it creates only a 
nontransferable personal defense and that the defense does not apply if the patent “was owned or 
subject to an obligation of assignment” to an institution of higher education.  AIA § 5(e) (codified at 
35 U.S.C.A. § 273(e) (2012)). 
65 In this Essay, we do not take a normative position regarding the relative merits of patents vs. trade 
secrecy in promoting innovation generally.  Rather, our more limited objective is to explain how the 
AIA has unexpectedly opened the door to dual patent and trade secret protection for the same 
invention and some of the undesirable consequences that may flow from this development.  For recent 
scholarship regarding the perceived benefits of trade secret protection in lieu of patenting, at least in 
certain circumstances, see generally J. Jonas Anderson, Secret Inventions, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 
917 (2011); Mark A. Lemley, The Surprising Virtues of Treating Trade Secrets as IP Rights, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 311 (2008). 
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justifications for exclusive patent rights.
66
  Elimination of the best mode 
requirement, therefore, may tilt the balance underlying the patent system 
in favor of inventors, who can now obtain exclusive rights while giving up 
fewer valuable secrets, at the expense of the general public, which may 
continue to see supracompetitive prices for technologies protected by best 
mode trade secrets after contemporaneously-issued patent rights expire.
67
 
This reform also provides a strong incentive for inventors to include in 
current and future patent applications less detail than in applications 
prosecuted in prior decades.  In light of widespread dissatisfaction in the 
patent community with the level of disclosure and detail in many patents 
now in force,
68
 any reform that lowers the disclosure bar is due a heavy 
dose of skepticism. 
All that said, is patent law nonetheless better off without a best mode 
litigation defense?  We doubt it.  Under scrutiny, Congress’s justifications 
do not hold much water.  First, although the decision to eliminate the best 
mode defense was primarily made to reduce litigation costs,
69
 there is 
good reason to believe the savings will be modest in most cases, while in 
others the reform may actually act to increase costs.   
In any case where a trade secret claim might be asserted along with 
patent rights
70—typically when the accused infringer is a former 
 
 
66 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 736 (2002) 
(“[E]xclusive patent rights are given in exchange for disclosing the invention to the public.”); 
Anderson, supra note 65, at 928 (“[T]heorists justify the patent system as a means of inducing the 
creation and disclosure of new and useful inventions. . .  .The goal is that in exchange for a twenty-
year period of exclusivity, inventors will be incentivized to create new and useful inventions and then 
reveal those innovations to the public.”). 
67 Congress’ decision to weaken the “quid pro quo” rationale for patent rights also comes at a time 
when some scholars have expressed serious doubts about common justifications for the patent system.  
See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 736-60 (2012) 
(summarizing deficiencies in each common justification for patent rights and proposing a new “patent 
race” rationale for the patent system); MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST 
INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008) (arguing for the abolition of all intellectual property 
protection).  But see generally ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2011). 
68 Literature decrying the uncertain boundaries of patent rights is legion.  See Brian J. Love, The 
Misuse of Reasonable Royalty Damages as a Patent Infringement Deterrent, 74 MO. L. REV. 909, 938-
39 (2009) (collecting articles documenting the uncertainty of patent scope). Moreover, some 
commentators report that patents are viewed in industry circles as so unhelpful that few innovators 
read them to learn about new technology.  See Lemley, supra note 18, at 21-22; Mark A. Lemley & 
Ragesh K. Tangri, Ending Patent Law’s Willfulness Game, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1085, 1100-01 
(2003) (“[I]n-house patent counsel and many outside lawyers regularly advise their clients not to read 
patents if there is any way to avoid it.”); Note, The Disclosure Function of the Patent System (or Lack 
Thereof), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2007, 2025 (2005) (explaining that due to “drafting strategies meant to 
ensure that patents are interpreted broadly by the courts . . . engineers often find it difficult to extract 
useful information” from them). But cf. Ouellette, supra note 18, at 534 (finding in a survey of 
nanotechnology researchers that 45% reported having read at least one patent to obtain technical 
information). 
69 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text; see also Sheppard, supra note 7. 
70 Prior to the AIA’s passage, one study suggested that parallel assertion of patent and trade secret 
claims was relatively uncommon.  See Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley, Copying in Patent 
Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1445 tbl. 1 (2009) (finding that trade secret misappropriation was alleged 
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employee, business partner, or prospective customer of the patentee
71—the 
existence of best mode trade secrets may extend litigation considerably.  In 
these cases, even if the patent-in-suit is invalidated in pretrial proceedings 
or on reexamination by the PTO, the patentee may continue to pursue the 
case on the remaining trade secret claim.
72
  A patentee may also benefit in 
other ways from bringing a parallel trade secret claim.  Most notably, 
while preliminary injunctions are relatively uncommon in patent cases,
73
 
rightsholders asserting trade secret claims obtain a preliminary injunction 
more than one-third of the time.
74
  
Consider, for example, an inventor who files a patent application 
covering the formula for a new plastic resin, but chooses not to disclose 
certain additional ingredients she uses to augment her own commercial 
embodiment.
75
  The PTO fails to discover this nondisclosure and issues a 
patent for the resin.  Meanwhile, the patentee protects her augmented 
version of the resin formula as though it were a trade secret.  In future 
litigation, the inventor could bring claims for both patent infringement and 
trade secret misappropriation.  Even if the accused infringer successfully 
invalidates the patent, post-AIA the case can continue on the theory that 
 
 
in 2.6% (5 of 193) of patent infringement complaints reviewed). 
71 See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in State Courts, 46 
GONZ. L. REV. 57, 69 (2011) (reporting that 77% of trade secret actions brought in state court were 
brought against the rightsholders’ employees or former employees, and 20% more were filed against 
business partners); David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in 
Federal Courts, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 291, 302 (2010) (reporting that 52% of trade secret actions brought 
in federal court were brought against the rightsholders’ employees or former employees, and 40% 
more were filed against business partners). 
72 For example, a prior public sale of the relevant technology by the patentee might invalidate a patent 
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), but not a trade secret if proper precautions were taken.  See, e.g., 
Syncsort, Inc. v. Innovative Routines, Int’l., Inc., No. 04–3623, 2011 WL 3651331, at *15 (D.N.J. 
Aug. 18, 2011) (“Since customers were required to sign a non-disclosure agreement, . . . the plaintiff’s 
measures were adequate to maintain its trade secrets.”). 
73 Carl Shapiro, Injunctions, Hold-Up, and Patent Royalties, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 280, 288 n.15 
(2010) (noting that in patent cases “[preliminary] injunctions are rare”).  A preliminary injunction 
motion in a patent case may be defeated by raising a good faith challenge to the patentee’s 
infringement claims or to the asserted patent’s validity.  See Amazon.com, Inc. v. 
Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1350-51 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“If [the accused infringer] raises 
a substantial question concerning either infringement or validity, i.e., asserts an infringement or 
invalidity defense that the patentee cannot prove ‘lacks substantial merit,’ the preliminary injunction 
should not issue.”).  As a result, few patentees bother to ask for preliminary injunctive relief unless the 
patent-in-suit has already survived scrutiny in a prior enforcement action.  And even those who believe 
their infringement claims are strong enough to justify the expense of a motion prevailed in preliminary 
injunction requests just 29.0% of the time during 2010-2011 (20 of 69 cases) according to Patstats.org, 
a database of patent litigation statistics.  See Patstats.org, Full Calendar Year 2010 Report, 
http://patstats.org/2010_full_year.rev5.htm (last visited July 2, 2012); Patstats.org, Full Calendar Year 
2011 Report, http://patstats.org/2011_Full_Year_Report.html (last visited July 2, 2012). 
74 See Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret Litigation in Federal Courts, supra note 
71, at 316 (reporting a success rate of 34.4% for preliminary injunction motions by trade secret holders 
in federal court). 
75 This example is loosely based on the facts of Wellman, Inc. v. Eastman Chem. Co., 642 F.3d 1355 
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (affirming summary judgment of invalidity of patent that failed to disclose certain 
ingredients used in inventors’ preferred formula and kept by inventors as a trade secret). 
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the accused infringer misappropriated the trade secret.
76
  Moreover, the 
inventor may have a better chance obtaining a preliminary injunction by 
virtue of the parallel trade secret claim, which could impose holdup costs 
on the accused infringer and lead to a quick, lucrative settlement that 
exceeds the invention’s actual economic value.77 
In other patent cases, the cost savings associated with eliminating best 
mode as a litigation defense may be quite modest, or even nonexistent, 
because the change likely will not significantly reduce the volume of 
discovery.  In post-AIA patent litigation, there is little reason to think that 
inventors will not be deposed, will be deposed for less time, or that 
substantially fewer documents will be requested or reviewed in discovery 
as a result of the AIA’s treatment of best mode.  So long as inequitable 
conduct remains a viable defense,
78
 accused infringers will still undertake 
expensive discovery to uncover what the inventor knew at the time his 
application was filed.
79
  To be sure, best mode’s elimination may 
occasionally knock a paragraph or two from accused infringers’ summary 
judgment briefs and shorten the list of issues for trial.  But we believe 
these savings are overstated by best mode critics.  As a fact-bound 
inquiry,
80
 best mode invalidations are rare at the summary judgment stage, 
and of course most patent cases settle before a summary judgment ruling.
81
  
 
 
76 Even when the accused infringer can advance evidence of independent invention, which is a defense 
to trade secret misappropriation, it is unlikely this issue will be resolved on summary judgment in any 
case where the inventor can proffer evidence of at least constructive knowledge of the secret 
information, as independent invention (or lack thereof) is a question of fact.  See, e.g., Droeger v. 
Welsh Sporting Goods Corp., 541 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1976). 
77 See Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Patent Holdup and Royalty Stacking, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1991, 
1993 (2007) (“[T]he threat of an injunction can enable a patent holder to negotiate royalties far in 
excess of the patent holder’s true economic contribution.”). 
78 The Federal Circuit’s recent en banc decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 
F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011), which is widely perceived as making inequitable conduct more difficult to 
establish, may have the effect of reducing the number of inequitable conduct claims.   But see Jason 
Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Therasense v. Becton Dickson: A First Impression, 14 YALE J.L. & 
TECH. 226, 249 (2012) (contending that “there is little reason to think” that Therasense “will result in 
fewer charges of inequitable conduct”).  Despite this, there have been several findings of inequitable 
conduct post-Therasense, suggesting that it will remain a viable defense.  See, e.g., Aventis Pharma. 
S.A. v. Hospira, Inc., 675 F.3d 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (affirming a district court’s finding of inequitable 
conduct because  it “withstands even the more rigorous standard adopted in Therasense”); Therasense, 
Inc. v. Becton Dickinson & Co., _ F. Supp. 2d __, 2012 WL 1038715 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2012)  (on 
remand in Therasense, finding that the patent-in-suit was unenforceable due to inequitable conduct 
even under the new standard articulated by the Federal Circuit); Network Signatures, Inc. v. State 
Farm Auto. Ins. Co., 2012 WL 2357307 (N.D. Cal. June 13, 2012) (finding both “but for” materiality 
and specific intent to deceive the PTO under the Therasense standard and holding the patent-in-suit 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct). 
79 See Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1287 (“To prevail on the defense of inequitable conduct, the accused 
infringer must prove that the applicant misrepresented or omitted material information with the 
specific intent to deceive the PTO.”). 
80 See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Schein Pharms., Inc., 301 F.3d 1306 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“Whether an applicant 
has complied with the best mode requirement of section 112 is a question of fact . . . .”).  
81 See, e.g., Jay Kesan & Gwendolyn Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. L. REV. 237, 273 tbl. 4 
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Also, like other types of complex civil litigation, only a small percentage 
of patent cases go to trial,
82
 and those that do are typically so complex that 
the myriad issues remaining will expand to fill the void left by best mode’s 
elimination. 
Some legislators’ additional criticism of best mode as overly 
subjective
83
 also misses the mark.  Though it is true that proving a best 
mode violation requires proof of the inventor’s subjective beliefs about the 
superiority of a particular embodiment,
84
 that subjective intent may be 
proven by inference from evidence obtained in discovery that is otherwise 
objective in nature—e.g., data from an analysis of various embodiments of 
the invention showing that one outperforms the others.
85
 
Moreover, despite some legislators’ expressed desire to align U.S. 
disclosure requirements with those of other countries,
86
 best mode reform 
in its current form does very little, if anything, to advance patent law 
harmonization.  In fact, the reform reduces patent prosecution costs for 
foreign inventors only to the extent it facilitates applicants’ ability to 
ignore the best mode requirement altogether and obtain U.S. patents with 
copies of foreign applications that do not disclose preferred 
embodiments.
87
  This, of course, is precisely what we fear will happen, 
and may well explain why legislators who hoped to bring U.S. disclosure 
requirements in line with those elsewhere in the world agreed to a 
 
 
(2006) (finding that over 80% of patent cases are resolved before summary judgment). 
82 Id. at 273 tbl. 4 (finding that only 6% of patent cases are decided at trial). 
83 See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text. 
84 See, e.g., Liquid Dynamics Corp. v. Vaughn Co., 449 F.3d 1209, 1223 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (explaining 
that best mode requires inquiring whether “the inventor subjectively considered a particular mode of 
practicing the invention to be superior to all other modes at the time of the filing the application” 
(internal quotations and citation omitted)). 
85 See DONALD S. CHISUM, 3 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 7.05[1] [c][i][B] (2012) (explaining that best 
mode is not violated “if there is no evidence that the inventor subjectively preferred any one of several 
possible implementations of the invention”). 
86 See supra notes 41-42 and accompanying text. 
87 As discussed above, the best mode requirement is uniquely American.  See supra note 41 and 
accompanying text.  Thus, a natural experiment to determine the consequences of best mode 
elimination in the U.S. might be to survey jurisdictions where best mode presently does not exist for 
related costs and benefits.  We believe, however, that such a comparison is impractical due to other 
confounding differences between U.S. and foreign patent practice.  For one, as a practical matter, most 
sophisticated foreign inventors are in fact subject to a best mode requirement and have been disclosing 
it for decades—i.e.., the U.S. best mode requirement.  International patentees routinely file parallel 
patent applications in the U.S., where they must publicly disclose their best mode and thus give up the 
possibility of trade secret protection here in the U.S. and abroad.  See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, NUMBER OF UTILITY PATENT APPLICATIONS FILED IN THE UNITED STATES, BY COUNTRY OF 
ORIGIN, CALENDAR YEARS 1965 TO PRESENT (Sept. 7, 2011), 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/appl_yr.htm (reporting that in 2010 more than half of 
all patent applications filed in the US were filed by foreign inventors).  Also, parallel intellectual 
property infringement claims are far less common in international jurisdictions—virtually all of which 
have fee-shifting regimes—because failure to prevail on even one cause of action will make the 
plaintiff responsible for a sizeable chunk of the accused infringers’ attorneys’ fees.  See Issachar 
Rosen-Zvi, Just Fee Shifting, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 717, 740 (2010) (“The English Rule, also known 
as the ‘loser pays rule,’ . . . reigns in the rest of the industrialized world . . . .”). 
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compromise that retained the best mode requirement but in an emasculated 
form.   
Finally, we believe Congress’s calculus on this issue failed to give 
proper weight to the fact that best mode may be more valuable to accused 
infringers as a shield rather than a sword.  While best mode rarely acts to 
affirmatively invalidate a patent, it has seemingly proven effective as a 
deterrent to parallel trade secret claims in U.S. patent litigation.  Before 
the AIA, an accused infringer faced with simultaneous patent and trade 
secret claims on the same technology could usually argue that the asserted 
patent was invalid for not disclosing the asserted trade secret as the best 
mode for practicing the patented invention.  In other words, the claims 
seriously undermined one another.
88
  Patentees thus tended to forego trade 
secret claims for fear of jeopardizing their patent rights.  In our estimation, 
best mode critics have focused too little on this invisible hand of 
deterrence—deterrence that no longer exists unless courts can fashion an 
alternative enforcement mechanism not precluded by the AIA.
89
 
C.  A Potential Response to Best Mode Trade Secret Claims 
Fortunately, the AIA appears to have left enough wiggle room for 
accused infringers to advance, and courts to apply, an alternative means of 
policing best mode violations.
90
  In this final Section, we outline one 
possible avenue for pursuing best mode violators in litigation without 
defying the AIA’s requirement that an undisclosed best mode will no 
longer render a patent “invalid or otherwise unenforceable.”91  
 
 
88 See, e.g., Joseph N. Hosteny, Patent or Trade Secret: Which One is Best?, IP TODAY, Aug. 2000, at 
2 (describing a case in which the inventor’s parallel trade secret claim was used to invalidate his patent 
on best mode grounds), available at http://www.hosteny.com/archive/hosteny%2008-00.pdf. 
89 Lee Petherbridge and Jason Rantanen have identified another underappreciated benefit of the best 
requirement:  it prevents others from patenting improvements to existing inventions that are obvious in 
light of disclosed preferred embodiments.  See Petherbridge & Rantanen, supra note 55, at 127-30. 
90 Others have written about deterrents to best mode concealment that focus on punishing lawyers later 
found to have assisted clients with the prosecution of patent applications that conceal best mode.  See 
Vacca, supra note 30, at 299-301; Sheppard, supra note 7.  In this Essay, we focus instead on avenues 
that accused infringers and courts can use to enforce the best mode requirement ex post in litigation. 
We see this as the preferable solution for at least two reasons.  First, inventors who wish to hold back 
best mode information may not share this intent with their counsel.  Counsel who unknowingly 
prosecute deficient patents cannot be found to have acted unethically.  Second, as a practical matter, 
best mode concealment will likely be uncovered only through discovery in patent litigation, and only 
about one percent of patents are ever litigated.  See Love, supra note 60, at *8, n.38 (finding that 
roughly 1.1% of issued patents are litigated); Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent 
Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1507 (2001) (estimating that only 1.5% of patents are litigated).  
Thus, viewed ex ante, the chances of discovery of an inventor’s failure to disclose best mode are quite 
slim—and virtually nil without a motivation for their discovery in litigation. 
91 AIA § 15(a) (codified at 35 U.S.C.A. § 282(a)(3)(A) (2012)) (emphasis added).   As another 
possible avenue, Sharon Sandeen has recently argued that trade secrecy claims for an invention’s best 
mode may be preempted by federal law because such claims would conflict with the disclosure 
purpose of federal patent law.  See Sharon K. Sandeen, Be Careful What You Wish For: Trade Secrets 
and the America Invents Act (unpublished manuscript 2012), 
16 
 
First, for best mode to continue to play any role in litigation, accused 
infringers must have access to relevant discovery.  Without the 
opportunity to probe inventors’ understanding of their inventions prior to 
applying for patent protection, best mode violations will virtually always 
go undetected.
92
  As we suggest above, though, this should be a very low 
hurdle to best mode enforcement in litigation.  Routine discovery into 
possible inequitable conduct by the inventor already covers the same 
ground.  Further, even if evidence supporting a traditional best mode 
defense is no longer admissible at trial, an applicant’s knowledge of a best 
mode seems “reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible 
evidence” relevant to a claim of inequitable conduct (not to mention the 
equitable defenses mentioned below).
93
  
Second, if discovery reveals an undisclosed best mode, nothing in the 
AIA prohibits an accused infringer or court from looking to equitable 
defenses for a response.  Before the development of the modern defenses 
of “inequitable conduct” and “patent misuse,” courts in patent cases 
routinely applied instead the amorphous equitable doctrine of unclean 
hands.
94
  Though it gradually fell out of fashion, we are aware of nothing 
that would prevent an accused infringer from invoking the doctrine now as 
a basis for a modicum of relief in a patent case short of invalidity or 
unenforceability of the patent in suit.
95
  In fact, unclean hands seems 
perfectly suited for that purpose—the doctrine “extend[s] to any 
inequitable, unconscionable, or bad faith conduct that is connected to the 
case”96 and grants courts a “wide range . . . of discretion in refusing to aid 
[an] unclean litigant.”97  
Relying on unclean hands, a court could at minimum dismiss a parallel 
trade secret claim brought in a case where the asserted trade secret should 
have been disclosed as the best mode in the inventor’s patent.98  Accused 
 
 
http://www.stanford.edu/dept/law/ipsc/PDF/Sandeen,%20Sharon%20-%20Abstract.pdf. 
92 See supra notes 59-60 and accompanying text. 
93 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (“Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the 
discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”). 
94 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) 
(“Inequitable conduct is an equitable defense to patent infringement that . . . . evolved from a trio of 
Supreme Court cases that applied the doctrine of unclean hands to dismiss patent cases involving 
egregious misconduct.”); see also Alan G. Greenberg, Unclean Hands as a Defense to Patent 
Infringement, 50 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 12 (1968).  
95 In addition to serving as the underlying basis for both the inequitable conduct and patent misuse 
doctrines in patent law, see id., unclean hands has also long been applied in copyright and trademark 
law.  See, e.g., Supermarket of Homes, Inc. v. San Fernando Valley Bd. of Realtors, 786 F.2d 1400, 
1408 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying “[t]he defense of unclean hands by virtue of copyright misuse”); Metro 
Publ’g., Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, Inc., 861 F. Supp. 870, 880 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (barring 
trademark infringement and dilution claims for unclean hands). 
96 T. Leigh Anenson, Limiting Legal Remedies: An Analysis of Unclean Hands, 99 KY. L.J. 63, 64 
(2010). 
97 Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 815 (1945). 
98 See Cataphote Corp. v. Hudson, 422 F.2d 1290, 1295-96 (5th Cir. 1970) (“Protection of trade secrets 
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infringers can reasonably argue that it is unjust for courts to allow 
patentees to violate the best mode requirement and then improperly reap 
the benefits of their misconduct by turning to trade secrecy.  Most 
importantly, because this remedy only limits the patentee’s recourse to 
trade secret protection without impacting her patent claims at all, it would 
not run afoul of the AIA’s restriction on best mode litigation defenses.  
In fact, unclean hands could do even more work for an accused 
infringer facing a best mode violator by, for example, limiting the types of 
available relief in the underlying patent case.  Patent claims are not 
completely sacrosanct under § 15 of the AIA; rather, it precludes only 
those responses to a best mode violation that would render the patent 
invalid or unenforceable.  Thus, courts could presumably rely on unclean 
hands to limit a patentee’s equitable remedies, specifically injunctive 
relief, for failing to disclose best mode.  It is long established that a 
plaintiff “cannot be awarded equitable remedy where it has gained an 
advantage by fraud or deceit”99 and, in other contexts, courts have 
recognized that a patentee’s unclean hands will bar the issuance of an 
injunction.
100
  This principle easily could be extended to prevent a 
preliminary or permanent injunction if the patentee has acted deceitfully in 
failing to disclose best mode. 
 
* * * 
Thus, while Congress may have unwittingly opened the door for best 
mode trade secrets, it may likewise have unwittingly left courts enough 
leeway to fashion equitable remedies that substantially remediate the 
problem.  Though less effective than the litigation defenses eliminated by 
the AIA, these measures can help courts and accused infringers ensure that 
patent holders do not benefit from failure to disclose valuable information 
that rightfully belongs in the public domain after the patent's expiration, 
rather than locked away potentially indefinitely as a trade secret. 
 
 
is an equitable doctrine. Secrets obtained by wrongful means are not entitled to protection, and the 
‘unclean hands’ doctrine may apply to deny the [rightsholder] protection.”).   
99 Neo Gen Screening, Inc. v. TeleChem Int’l, Inc., 69 Fed. Appx. 550, 556 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 
Keystone Driller Co. v. General Excavator Co., 290 U.S. 240, 245 (1933)).  Courts are, however, 
divided on whether unclean hands may limit damages.  See Anenson, supra note 96, at 65. 
100 See, e.g., Keystone Driller Co., 290 U.S. at 245 (holding unclean hands doctrine barred patent 
action for injunctive relief where plaintiff bribed third party to suppress evidence of possible use of 
invention prior to filing of plaintiff’s application for patent on same invention). 
 
